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The eight weeks of the "Great Stench" in London in June-July 1858 had a lasting effect on
the city. Today's embankments were planned then, and the huge oval brick sewers of London
were designed and constructed as a direct result ofthe stench.
The event occurred before the bacteriological era, when fear ofcholera caused by a miasma
gripped the city. This article, through quotations from The Times, Punch, and the medical press,
traces the various reactions to the stink and explores the reasons why there wasn't more of a
public reaction to the plague threat.
The "Great Stench" could notbe said to have started innocuously. Thefirstformal
warning in The London Times was graphic in its description of the state of the
Thames and included all ofthe fearful aspects ofthe problem. It was ofsuch a small
scale, however, that no one could have predicted that the odor would eventually
interferewith the properfunctioning ofboth houses ofParliament andbring tears to
the eyes ofmuch ofLondon.
The year was 1858, the exact date of The Times letter was June 15. The letterwas
briefand frightening:
Sir: The stinks of our once noble and respected father Thames are now too
nauseous for endurance. I rowed on Saturday from Westminster to the
Crabtree in Putney Reach and there was no intermittence-no cessation-
one fatal, horrid, open, deadly cesspool. What is to be done? Signed,
Oarsman [1].
Actually, The Times was rather late in identifying the problem. TheBritishMedical
Joumal had carried two earlier items, under "Parliamentary Intelligence," one on
June 5 and the other on June 12, about the "State ofthe Thames." It was not a new
problem even in 1858. A select committee of the House of Commons had been
appointed to consider the subject. Both of the British MedicalJournal articles were
reporting questions in the House to the Chief Commissioner of Works, the body
entrusted with recommending a solution to the stehch.
Three interesting themes appeared in these early reports, motifs that character-
ized much of the consideration of the problem for the two months it persisted and
that would affect the eventual solution. First, how did this undesirable situation
arise? Second, was there enough known about the problem to solve it? And third,
529
Address reprint requests to: John D. Thompson, Dept. of Epidemiology and Public Health, Yale
University SchoolofMedicine, 60 College St., NewHaven, CT06510
Copyright © 1991 by The Yale Journal ofBiology and Medicine, Inc.
All rights ofreproduction in any form reserved.JOHN D. THOMPSON
important because this was the very time when the miasma theory of disease
causation was still in its ascendancy, what was perceived as the likely effect of the
cloud offoul air on the health ofLondon?
WHAT CAUSED THE STENCH
Most commentators on the stench of 1858 agree on the reasons why it arose that
very year. The situation perfectly illustrates the observation that, more often than
one would wish, today's health problem is the result of yesterday's solution. The
theory isgrounded on the observation that it is difficult to intervene incomplexsocial
interrelationships or in delicate environmental balances without doing harm or at
least mischief in the future.
It was held, even among the non-professional observers, that the sad state of the
Thames could be explained:
In the old days the sewers were merely the rivers, [Thames] tributaries
covered over and these discharged their stinking contents into the river at low
water. In 1847 cesspoolswere made illegal and all London's sewagewas made
to flow into the sewers and go into the river. Within a few years some two
hundred thousand cesspools were abolished. The effects on the river were
appalling, for it became the main-and-open-sewer ofLondon [2].
Afootnote in another history ofthe time states:
During the summer of 1858, which was exceptionally dry, so that the levels of
water in the Thamesbecame much lower than usual. In the middle oftheyear
complaints of the nuisance arising from the River became widespread and
there was general alarm in London about the danger to the public health [3].
Nor was the stench unpredictable. The condition of the Thames had been
deteriorating for some years, but not enough attention had been paid to the hazards
presentedbyitstransformation into a sewer. In hisveryfirst reportnineyearsearlier,
John Simon, then Health Officer for London, stated:
But I can have no hesitation in stating it is a mattergreatlytobe desired in the
cityofLondon that the noble riverwhich ebbs and flowsbeneath its dwellings
should cease to be the drainpool ofourvast metropolis [4].
The accounts of the "State of the Thames," as it was usually referred to at the
time, recognized exactly what was happening and why. In spite of the marked
discomfort, an air ofoptimism characterized many ofthe written reports. One ofthe
typical lead articles was that appearing on August 7, 1858:
Of 1000 people in London, ten died unnatural deaths; let it be assumed for a
moment-that three are killed by the poisonous emanations from cesspools,
closets and sinks in dwelling houses, offices, workshops, that two die of
diseases inducedbythe emanations from dirty streets orgullies, and one from
the vapors around the Thames. Here evidently a great step is gained by the
water system superceding the cesspool, as the noxious matter isprojected into
the sewers under the streets, and is partially oxidized. If the cesspools,
therefore, are everywhere abolished, and the house is purified, the mortality
on the above hypotheses willbe reduced to the extentof3.... The progressof
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sanitary measures in London has hitherto resulted in removing impurities
from the dwelling houses into the sewers and the Thames and this enables us
to understand howthe mortalityhad declined as the Thames hasgrown fouler
[5].
In fact, it almost seems as if some of the observers of the stench welcomed it. As
one leader in The Times stated in the issue of the twenty-first of July: "That hot
fortnight did for the sanitary administration of the metropolis what the Bengal
mutinies did for the administration ofIndia" [6].
WHAT MUST BE DONE
Although there was general agreement on the cause of the stench and even
stronger agreement that something had to be done, there was no single, acceptable
solution to the problem. There were variations ofthree approaches to rid London of
the smelly miasma: narrow the river through the construction ofembankments, treat
the water with chemicals to precipitate the sewage, or build intercepting sewers
parallel to the river to transport the water to a location outside London.
These three approacheswere all considered in the light ofthe agencywhichwould
carry out the work and whether or not the "human guano" was to be used as
fertilizer.
The Metropolitan Board of Works was at this time under critical examination,
having only recently (1855) succeeded a Consolidated Commission for Sewers,
unsuccessful in its seven-year attempt to solve the London sewage problem as
exacerbated by the replacement of cesspools with Hopper closets connected to the
old rivers that flowed into the Thames. Nevertheless, as is pointed out by Frazier:
Because of its unsatisfactory local government structure, London did not act
as an example to the rest of the country in the effort towards sanitary
improvement.... Most of the sanitary duties of the Metropolis were per-
formed by the vestries, and the Metropolitan Board ofWorks for some years
after its founding in 1855 was onlyresponsible for the main sewers and streets
[7].
TheBritish MedicalJoumal coverage ofdebates in Parliament reports:
Mr. Mangles [an M.P.] asked the ChiefCommissioner ofWorkswhat steps he
has taken or proposes to take to preserve the health of the two Houses of
Parliament from being destroyed by the present pestilential condition of the
River Thames? Mr. Mangles denounced the Metropolitan Board ofWorks as
altogether inefficient for useful purposes [8].
The matter ofusing the human excrement for fertilizer was mainly discussed as a
source of revenue to offset the enormous expense of any solution to the stench
problem.
Trench and Hillman refer to a study, ordered in 1857 by the Government referees
on the Main Drainage of the Metropolis, to look into this possibility. Two chemists,
Messrs. Hoffman and Witt, recommended rejecting the idea of using the waste as
manure on the basis that the Chinese who did so were
. . . a people numerous as ants, andwho have to live in boats because the land
is too crowded to hold them with any comfort, must be often at theirwits end
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toprocure food, and are, therefore, nomodelsfor awell-to-do civilized nation
to copy [9].
This same study (without its conclusion) was cited in the comprehensive leading
article inLancet, entitled "Report upon the Present Condition ofthe Thames," July
10, 1858. The value Messrs. Hoffman and Witt placed on the annual worth of the
sewage was £1,385,540. The Report concluded that "every effort should be made to
utilize the sewage thus conveyed to a distance" [10].
It seems from the written evidence that the London medical establishment
strongly supported the use of "human guano" as fertilizer. In the above-mentioned
report ofJohn Simon, hewrote thatwhen the sewage was conveyed to some "distant
destination, where instead of breeding sickness and mortality, it might become a
source ofagricultural increase and naturalwealth" [11].
TheMedical Times and Gazettewas even more ofan advocate ofreuse in a leading
article treating a proposal of a Mr. F.O. Ward, who held that "to throw away the
ammonia and phospherumofLondon sewage is tothrow away,virtually, bread" [12].
His scheme would have the outfall of sewage to be a suitable tract of land. The
Gazette said that "Our opinion has always been, that no plan could be good which
involved the entire loss ofthe London sewage" [13].
EvenPunch wrote a paean to reuse:
So shall fat kine by thousands feed,
On many a sewagewatered mead,
Whence from old cropswill spring,
And from sleekfarmerswell content,
Ten pounds per acre extra rent
Fields thus manuredwillbring [14].
The terms used to disguise the material floating on the river also came under
examination by Punch. In response to a statement by the Registrar General: "This
country can never be satisfied until the water which is distributed through its
dwellings carries away all the town guano to fertilize the land," Punch composed a
poem:
Just as rose by anyother name,
Would smell as sweet, so a nice title can no
Fragrance impart towhatwill smell the same
Though Mr. Registrar maycall it guano [15].
The debate over the solution of choice was preempted by consideration of the
bizarre observations and theories ofWilliam Odling, as translated into aproposal for
solving the problem by Goldsworthy Gurney, a one-time surgeon and prominent
inventor, whose steam-driven carriage may have been thefirst bus to travel the roads
of England. Dr. Odling, referred to by the British Medical Journal as the Medical
Officer of Health for Lambeth [16], but who identified himself as from Guy's
Hospital [17], was in an enviable position when the stench came; he had been
studying theproblem over the previous ninemonths, issuing a report on the eleventh
of March 1858. He had predicted the occurrence of the problem for the upcoming
summer, and his solution was cheaper than those proposed byothers.
His observation that he could find no sulfuretted hydrogen in the water of the
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Thames due to its great oxidizing power was explained by a theory that the stench
came from the mud along the banks of the river where some of the sewage was
deposited and not from the river itself.
Mr. Goldsworthy Gurney then posited that the problem could be solved by
narrowing the river with terraced solid embankments to get rid of the mud and
digging two channels in the river, into which sewage would be dumped below the
low-water line, thus hurrying its travel through London and out to sea. There was
also the suggestion that the gases emanating from the now water-locked sewers
should be burned in outlets (furnaces) in the streets.
The inquiry of the Select Committee appointed by the House of Commons to
evaluate the Gurney proposal was thoroughly reported in The Times of July 1 [18]
and 9 [19]. The final conclusion appeared in The Times on July 21:
Your committee cannot recommend the adoption ofany part ofMr. Gurney's
plan. Any plan which has for its object that all the sewage of London should,
in the state which it comes down the sewers, be discharged into the stream of
the Thameswould tend toperpetuate and not toremedythe evilswhich are so
widely felt and so loudly complained of [20].
Mr. Gurneywas later knighted (in 1863) for improving the lighting andventilation
ofthe House ofCommons.
Dr. Odling was treated rather roughly by his colleagues and by writers to The
Times. The very first treatment of the stench recounted a question in the House of
Commons directed toward Lord J. Manners, the first Commissioner ofWorks, about
the findings of Dr. Odling. Lord Manners answered: "If Dr. Odling was unable to
discover sulfuretted hydrogen in the Thames water, he would recommend the hon.
gentleman to inquirewhether hewasequallyunable to discover it inthe Thames air"
[21]. A letter to The Times was even more specific: ". . . perhaps the learned doctors
will inform us what is the name for the abominable smell that does come from the
Thames at the present time" [22].
The British MedicalJournal became quite critical in its own later leading articles:
"It is with extreme regret that we find a medical man thus attempting to make us
disbelieve the evidence of our senses" [23]; and later: "That the Thames is in a
dreadful condition, not withstanding the fine talk of Dr. Odling, there can be no
doubt" [24]. The Lancet, while not mentioning Odling by name, states, "By several
writers the whole ofthe mischief has been attributed to the mud which accumulates
on both sides ofthe river.... this view is far from correct.... Statements like these
inflict the greatest injury on science, and produce in the mind of the public great
mistrust ofits professors" [25].
One gets the impression that the chemical solution to the stench arose out of the
fact that, during the period ofhigh odor, the government was throwing about £1,500
per week worth of lime in the water of the Thames near the outlets of the main
sewers [26].
The discussion ofa chemical solution took on a peculiar slant. There was the story
in The Times of the deodorizing and disinfection process as a cheaper alternative to
themillionsofpoundsproposed tobuildintercepting sewers. Theword"disinfecting"
is interesting here, since there was as yet no infectious theory to require such a
process. The term seems to be synonymous with "purifying" in a non-bacteriological
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sense. The Times piece reported an experiment at "the chemical works" of the
Messrs. Condy at Battersea, involving Condy's "patent disinfecting fluid":
Two large glasses were filled with sewage water emitting a most offensive
odor, that in one oftheglassesbeingsubjected to the action oflime, while into
the other a small quantity of the disinfecting fluid was poured. Both those
substances operated effectively as precipitants, but it was alleged that, where
as in the former deodorization simply had taken place, in the case ofthe latter
actual disinfection had been produced, owing to the fact that the organic
impurities contained in the water which had been subjected to its influence
had undergone a process of combustion, and that the cause of the odor or
putrification had in consequence been permanently removed [27].
The major proponent of the chemical solution was Dr. A.J. Bernays, then at St.
Mary's, later a Professor ofChemistry and Dean at St. Thomas's. In two long letters
in the Medical Times and Gazette [28,29], Bernays sets the agenda for the chemical
solution. Hepreferred the disinfectant of Messrs. Smith and MacDougal, rating that
ofCondy below chloride of lime. The Smith and MacDougal solution contained coal
kreosote (carbonic acid). Theproblem with this approach was that the chemical had
to be applied to the sewage before decomposition had set in, which was difficult
unless itwas done in thehouses, and the totalprogram was based on the ability to sell
the guano once it had been disinfected.
In the end, the exact solution ofchoice was that suggested by the engineers to the
Metropolitan Board of Works, Messrs. Bidder, Hawksley, and Bazalgette. Though
their report did little to clarify the state of the Thames [30,31], their recommenda-
tions were accepted, i.e., that no sewage be permitted to pass into the river, that
interceptory sewers parallel to the river must be laid, and that the embankments be
built to narrow the river (and in one instance to contain one of the sewers) and
provide vertical sides to it through its course above London Bridge [32].
The short-lived Derby Government proposed a bill, authored by Disraeli, the
Chancellor of the Exchequer, that gave the Metropolitan Board of Works the
funding and the authority to fix the stench. The bill was really a plan to raise three
million pounds and did not address the solution at all. Punch promptly referred to
the money as a "stinking fund" [33].
Thesedecisions,thoughincomplete, were made with remarkable speed, seemingly
fueled by the public concern about the stink rather than the perceived danger from
thevaporsarising from the river. Whatwasfascinating aboutwritten evidence during
the two months was the expressed ambivalence about the validity of the "miasma
theory." This theory held that epidemics were caused by noxious gases generated
from rotting organic material in the ground. Gill traces the theory to Hippocrates,
who "observing the sudden and almost simultaneous emergence of epidemics,
should regard some generalized phenomenon of a celestial, terrestrial or telluric
nature as apredominant influence in theircausation" [34]. Indeed, he points out that
the"miasmatictheory," withonlyminormodifications, held the field for nearly 2,000
years. InEngland thetheorywas somewhat modified by Sydenham but was generally
unchanged in its belief in the airborne communication of disease from the environ-
ment to man.
The "miasmatheory" of disease causation wascompletely accepted in England at
the time of the stench because it not only seemed to explain the why, when, and
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where of the occurrence of those epidemics so frightening to the public, but it also
served as a platform for social action. Ackerknecht wrote ofthe fascinating phenom-
enon ofthe nadir ofthe acceptability ofthe contagious theory ofdisease just before
its ultimate victorywith thepublication ofListerin 1867 [35]. Additional insights into
the conflict between the contagious and miasmic theories are presented by Tesh in
"Nineteenth Century Debates" [36].
The important feature ofthe theoryin 1858was that it hadbeen transformed from
an explanatory concept which, as Tesh has characterized it, removed the blame for
the cause ofdisease from any individual or controllable force, and transferred it to a
theory serving as a basis for prevention. It was transformed to a concept that the
miasma was generated by filth, and to prevent the threat of the miasma meant
removing the filth [37]. As such, the theory served as the moving force of England's
first General Board of Health under Chadwick and Dr. Southwood Smith. Winslow
points out that the Sanitary Revolution occurred before the work of Lister, Pasteur,
and Koch and that itwasbased on the miasma theory [38].
An example of the centrality of the miasma theory appeared early during the
concern with the presence of the miasma (stench) in the air. In reporting another
questioning in the House of Commons of the Chief Commissioner of Works as to
whether
... in any consideration of the state of the water of the Thames, the whole
question at issue was that ofthe effect on the purity ofthe airwhich might be
produced by the liberation ofgasses injurious to health from the water. Lord
J. Manners saidthathethought the questions ofthe honorablegentlemenwas
put ratherwith aview ofstating a theory than ofobtaining information [39].
Othersfirmlybelieved in the theory; forinstance, Alfred Smee,whose letter to The
Times read:
It must nowbe regarded unsafe for man, woman or child toventure upon our
river; for nomedical man canpredictwho maybe affected andwe can only say
that the putrid fermentation is liable in the higher degree to communicate its
death producing influence....
In August and the first week of September the air is stagnant and no breeze
refreshes its inhabitants, the putrescence may endanger diseases of a conta-
gious type such as fever or plague: and how great would be the panic if a few
leading men in successionwould fall a prey [40].
The medical press was only slightly more constrained in their treatment of the
dangers ofthe stench. The British MedicalJoumal, in a leading article, asked "What
is to become of us Londoners in the year of grace 1858? Are the terrible events of
1665 to be repeated and is thisvast metropolis to be devastated by the plague?" [41].
TheMedical Times andReview reported:
The "Thames" is becoming so unbearable that every one is crying out
something mustbe done! ... from the Dreadnought [a hulkused as a hospital
ship anchored in the Thames] it is stated by the resident medical officer that
during the last week the effluvium from the Thames water has been of the
most sickening character ... [42].
The Dreadnought was floated downstream to Greenwich, where the stink was less
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obnoxious. TheMedical Times and Gazette then suggested that consideration should
be given to moving some ofLondon's hospitals into rural sites [43].
Lancet, in rebuttal to those who did not hold the situation to be of immediate
danger, opined:
We know that the stench from the mud banks and from the water itself is so
great, that strong and healthy become faint and even vomit, and that it
produces fever ... [44].
Discussion about recent findings in probable disease causality were limited. Even
Farr's "elevation theory" was somewhat misinterpreted: "But it is shown by the
tables of the Registrar General that elevation and good drainage have much more
influence on the health ofthe population than proximity to the river" [45]. The study
ofthe cholera epidemic was done in Londonwhere "elevations" were closely related
to distance from the river, higher elevations being farther from the Thames [46].
Langmuir interprets Farr's figures as "an extraordinary epidemiological confirma-
tion ofthe [miasma] hypothesis" [47].
What is a bit unusual about the documents covering the great stench is the
occasional light and comic treatment of a problem considered to be serious and
threatening. One would expect such treatment from Punch, which referred to the
progress of the solution of the stench as "slow but-sewer" and "to the works of a
Board that is nil." The "poem" referring to the Queen's trip on the river was an
example ofthis type ofcoverage:
The River's Perfume was sovile
The Sovereign, as she neared Dog's Isle,
Was fain to hold-nay do not smile-
Abouquet to her nose [48].
Punch did, however, publish two frightening cartoons on the stench; one depicted
death as the oarsman, the other depicted Father Thames's children as cholera,
scrofula, and diphtheria.
Even the Lancet, after publishing the most thorough analysis of the state of the
Thames, wrote:
... aproposition that does not command ourunqualified assent. They assume
that, granting the Thames to be the cloaca maxima ofLondon, there is in this
a great reproach to this mightycity [49].
The article then goes on to point out that Babylon had its Euphrates, Nineveh its
Tigris, and Rome its Tiber, which were all used to wash the wastes of these great
cities.
The Times reported the flight from the committee room ofthe House ofCommons
in avery humorousvein:
... when a sudden rush fromthe room tookplace foremost amongthembeing
the Chancellor ofthe Exchequer [Disraeli] who with a mass ofpapers in one
hand and with his pocket handkerchief clutched in the other and applied
closely to his nose, with body half bent, hastened in dismay from the
pestilential odor, followed closely by Sir James Graham who seemed to be
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attacked by a sudden fit of expectoration; Mr. Gladstone also paid particular
attention to his nose, while Mr. Cayley sought a solace and relief from the
stenchwhich prevailed in a cup ofcoffee [50].
TheLancet, when reporting this incident, was not at all sympathetic:
The utter selfishness of both Houses was never more clearly shown than in
this instance. This great public question has hitherto been regarded by them
simply as a great public nuisance; and now suddenly their own comfort is
affected.... The architect hangs a sort of plague flag of distress at all the
windows-matting steeped in chloride oflime [51].
Shortly after this report, both The Times and the Lancet reported on sumptuous
dinners at the Ships Hotel in Greenwich "to demonstrate that, however noxious the
state of the Thames might be in London, Greenwich enjoys an immunity from the
nuisance," and it was said thewhitebait fish caught there were very tasty [52,53].
However frightening the threat of the miasma was stated to be, there was not,
according to the contemporary references, a flight from London, though the sense of
dangerwas quite palpable. It can be inferred from the documented descriptions that
there were three reasons for the absence ofpanic: first, there appeared a believable
study ofthe effect ofthe stench; second, evidence seemed to point to attenuation in
thebeliefofthe miasma theory; and, last, the presence ofawarning system allowed a
more measured reaction to the possibilityofreal dangers.
On the ninth of July, William M. Ord, M.D., surgical registrar of St. Thomas's,
then located on the south side of London Bridge, reported on a two-week study of
the effects of the stench on lightermen, dock laborers, watermen, and others
employed upon or about the Thames. The unexpected results were the absence of
diseaseswith diarrhea.
Ord claimed personally to have questioned nearly 200 such men and described
symptoms of poisoning by foul exhalations. These were new conditions, not present
before the stench. Most of these symptoms seemed to be located in the central
nervous system and were identified as languor, nausea, and headache. After a time,
giddiness was experienced, along with disturbances of vision, and often mental
confusion [54].
The results ofthe studywere reported in theBritishMedicalJournal, and emphasis
was again given to the absence of diarrheal diseases [55]. The disease that most
threatened the fearful writers was cholera. It hadn't been too long before (1853-
1854) that there had been an epidemic of that disease in the areas of London near
the river.
Both Ackerknecht and Rosen, while insisting that the miasmatic theory was the
"official" one, point out that there were some "contingent contagionists" in leading
positions of authority at the time of the stench; John Simon, Health Officer for the
Privy Council, held suchviews. In his second Report to the Privy Council in 1859, he
addressed the problem ofdiarrheal disease, stating:
The excess ofmortality (from these diseases) has in all places been consistent
with one or the other of two definite local circumstances; the tainting of the
atmosphere with the products oforganic decomposition especially of human
excrement,-or the habitual drinkingofimpure water [56].
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Simon was thus trying to strike a compromise between the miasma theory and the
recent findings of John Snow and his own paper later, examining the cholera
epidemics of 1848 and 1853,where the disease was traced to the water supply [57].
Snow's work was mentioned only once in the review of commentaries about the
stench, and that was a reference to the studies of the high mortality in the 1853
epidemic of those who obtained their water from the Southwick and Vauxhall
Company, and thatperhapsthe reason everyone escaped cholerathusfar in 1858was
because Thames water taken near the bridge was not then supplied by any of the
London water companies [58].
There are several references to a similar contingent theory, that an epidemic could
onlybe caused by the miasma and the presence ofa few cases ofcholera at the same
time. An example ofthis point ofview is the letter ofJohn Challot, M.D., the Health
Officer ofLambeth:
Slow but certain poisoning going on ofthe portion ofthe London population
dwelling on the banks or near to the Thames.... Fortunately or providen-
tially, we are atpresentfree from epidemic cholera. Itspresence nowwould in
all human probability be unprecedented disastrous to life [59].
Many others held similar contingent views. William Farr, for example, explained
the rise and fall ofsuch an epidemic on the presence or absence of "cholorine," the
specific zyme of cholera. One might suspect that some of the concern about
sulfuretted hydrogenwas an attempt tofractionate the miasma into component parts
and thus demythicize it.
Parliament's solution to the stench was not the onlypiece oflegislation ofconcern
to the medical establishment during the session of 1858. Two bills, one vitally
affecting the medical profession, the other marking a major shift in the administra-
tion of the public health services, were proposed by the Derby conservative govern-
ment during the time of the stench. The Medical Act of 1858 established legal
definitions of medical practitioners, and created a medical register and a General
Medical Council of Education to supervise professional morals and education [60].
The new Public Health Bill did away with the General Board of Health altogether
and placed its Medical Officer (John Simon) under the PrivyCouncil; thusbegan the
official attenuation ofthe miasma theory and the forced sanitary reforms committed
in its name. As Lambert stated, after 1858
JohnSimon realizedthathealthadministration must itselfwaituponscientific
certitude. Instead ofbelligerent dogmatism there must be incessant socioepi-
demiological research of the strictest scientific integrity. Instead of an engi-
neering monomania, and administrative impetuosity there must be a wide
diversity of approaches and almost an excessive caution in devising and
imposingpractical solutions [61].
The stench had very little to do with the adoption of these two pieces of
legislation-except indirectly-by limiting debate. Punch, in an attempt to puncture
the satisfaction felt by the Derby Government at the end of the parliamentary
session, projects in verse Father Thames appearing at the celebration (a Greenwich
whitebait dinner) attended bythe ministers:
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Quoth he, "suchvisitors I hail:
My Lords and Commons, how d'ye do,
Ifanygratitude were here,
You should have asked me toyour feast,
Ofall your motley friends thisyear,
Thames has not been the last or least.
I lurked behind your terrace wall,
I breathed athwartyourwindow blind,
Up throughyour chimneys I would crawl,
Or throughyour air shafts entrance find,
Thanks most to me, the Session's done,
Your foes have fled: tiz me they fear,
Mine are the triumphs you have won,
Yet uninvited I stand here" [62].
Therewas, then, enough doubt that themiasmaofthe stenchwould cause aplague
in that summer of 1858 to recommend an active preventative stance while examining
the effect of the stench on the population. Such a course of action was proposed by
theLancet, which advised:
Every hygienic precaution should be taken by individuals, byhouseholders, by
persons in authority and by medical officers of health. Without sounding any
untimely note ofalarm, we may assert that there is sufficient ground to call for
the closest attention on the part of all, to those measures of sanitary care
which avert or diminish zymotic disease [63].
The main thrust of the article was to urge everyone to scan the weekly bills of
mortality, up to the hot, dry summer "carelessly unread," and indeed all three
medical publications and The Times printed articles on the "State of the Public's
Health" or "The Health of London" in almost every issue. The Registrar General's
Reports were published as often as the letters complaining about the odors. A
careful review of these reports fails to reveal any notable increase in mortality in
London during the weeks ofthe stench.
And nothing terrible happened to the population of London. Punch, in an article,
"Sunned-out Doctors," claimed that "owing to the long continued fine weather,
many practitioners have been thrownwholly out ofemployment notwithstanding the
state of the Thames in London and the general neglect of sanitary arrangements in
Town and Country."Punch was concerned that these practitioners would notbe able
to pay the fee oftwoguineas imposed on them by the new Medical Act.
The Great Stench disappeared in the last part of July [65], with a drop in the
temperature and a fall ofrain.
THE FOOL'S ARGUMENT
The Great Stench is a paradigm for policy analysis dealing with a long-standing
unhealthful environment caused by previous solutions to other health-threatening
practices. For some time, the poor and unenfranchised were especially at risk.
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A crisis occurred which affected all strata of society, with some selection of the
politically powerful. The situation was so dramatic that there was unanimity in the
realization that something must be done-now.
Several solutions were put forward-one was selected, but only after resources
and political will were committed to the choice, the latter factor as important as the
former. As is usual with such processes, the only unanimity was to something-not
whatwas proposed.
Taken altogether, the debate ofMonday eveningwas agood expression ofthe
actual conditions attending the great metropolitan drainage question. Most
people can find objections to the measure proposed, nobody feels quite
satisfied, in most quarters there are strong misgivings and yet in the end the
Bill is read a second time without so much as a division. The truth is that this
happens to be a case where the fool's argument that "something must be
done," is really applicable [66].
And so the great brick sewers of London were planned and built; over a hundred
miles of interceptory sewers were laid between 1859 and 1865. It is said that 318
millionbrickswere required "carrying the contents ofsome 450 miles ofmain sewers
which are themselves served by 13,000 miles of smaller local sewers" [67], and the
price of bricks in London rose by 50 percent [68]. The embankments were a big
success; they notonly narrowed the river, but also served as locations for some ofthe
interceptory sewers as well as subway lines. Joseph Bazalgette, the engineer and
designerofboth,was knighted, and nearthe Embankment stationofthe District line
on the Victoria Embankment his reliefis mounted in a commemorative plaque. The
stench did not recur, but the sewage reentered the river 14 miles downstream.
Industrial wastes rather than human wastes soon repolluted the river [69].
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